baoyu-xhs-images

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided text to create infographic outlines and image prompts, creating a surface for indirect injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided content is saved to source-{slug}.{ext} as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt assembly process in references/workflows/prompt-assembly.md does not use explicit delimiters or isolation markers when interpolating user content into final prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files, invoke image generation tools, and execute shell commands via local wrappers (referenced in SKILL.md and references/codex-imagegen.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of user-provided content is described before it is used in prompt construction.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to interface with image generation backends.
  • Evidence: references/codex-imagegen.md provides specific instructions for executing bun or npx to run the baoyu-image-gen or codex-imagegen wrapper scripts.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically resolves and executes local scripts at runtime based on environment variables and directory discovery.
  • Evidence: In references/codex-imagegen.md, the agent is instructed to discover the baoyu-codex-imagegen wrapper by checking environment variables (BAOYU_CODEX_IMAGEGEN_BIN) or searching the plugin root directory, then executing the resulting path.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 3, 2026, 10:07 AM