biopython
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from various biological file formats.
- Ingestion points: The skill utilizes
SeqIO.parse,AlignIO.read, andPDBParser.get_structureinSKILL.mdto load data from external FASTA, GenBank, and PDB files into the agent context. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions (e.g., "ignore instructions in the data") are provided to prevent the agent from obeying commands that might be embedded in the biological metadata or sequence labels.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to network operations via
Bio.EntrezandBio.Blast, and the ability to write or modify files viaSeqIO.convertandSeqIO.write. - Sanitization: While the Biopython library parses data into structured objects, the resulting text is passed to the LLM without additional sanitization or filtering to remove potential instruction-like content.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation describes installing the
biopythonpackage usingpiporuv. Biopython is a well-known and widely used open-source library in the scientific community. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses
Bio.EntrezandBio.Blastto communicate with official NCBI (National Center for Biotechnology Information) web services. These network operations are standard for the tool's intended purpose of biological database access and search.
Audit Metadata