create-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository environment (such as PR descriptions, commit messages, and documentation files) and interpolates it into the agent's context to generate pull request content.
- Ingestion points: Metadata and history are read in
SKILL.md(Sections 1 and 2) and through lookup commands inreferences/github.mdandreferences/gitlab.md. - Boundary markers: The skill identifies and filters bot-generated content using specific HTML comment markers, though it lacks general delimiters for other user-contributed content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write to the local filesystem (e.g.,
.git/PR_BODY.md), execute a bundled Python script for linting, and perform authenticated API operations viaghorglabCLIs to create or update PRs. - Sanitization: The skill uses
scripts/lint_body.pyto enforce style and structure. Crucially, it implements a manual confirmation step (§5. Confirm inline) that requires the user to approve the drafted title and body before any changes are pushed to the remote host. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell-based operations using
git,gh(GitHub CLI),glab(GitLab CLI), andpython3to manage repository state and validate drafted content. These commands are well-scoped to the skill's primary purpose and utilize secure practices, such as passing content via files (--body-file) to prevent shell injection vulnerabilities.
Audit Metadata