submit-changes
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and processes local repository documentation and historical pull request data to learn project conventions, which constitutes a potential injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads files such as
AGENTS.md,CONTRIBUTING.md,.github/copilot-instructions.md, and recent pull request descriptions as specified in the 'Detect conventions' section ofSKILL.md. - Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to perform git operations (push, rebase, merge) and execute GitHub (
gh) and GitLab (glab) CLI commands to create or update pull requests. - Sanitization: The skill uses a dedicated Python script (
scripts/lint_body.py) to validate the drafted PR body against specific rules, providing a automated layer of oversight before the content is presented to the user. - Boundary markers: While no explicit delimiters are used for ingested content, the process enforces a strict user confirmation step ('Go ahead with this?') before any pushes or host writes occur.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands and sub-processes to perform repository introspection.
- Evidence:
scripts/lint_body.pyexecutesgit diff --name-onlyviasubprocess.runto ensure that files referenced in the PR description are actually included in the diff. - Best Practices: The instructions in
references/github.mdandreferences/gitlab.mdexplicitly mandate the use of--body-fileand--description-fileflags rather than passing content via shell arguments, effectively mitigating common shell injection vectors.
Audit Metadata