bibi-library
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation in
references/auth.mdand the detection scriptscripts/bibi-check.shrecommend installing the CLI tool usingcurl -fsSL https://bibigpt.co/install.sh | bash. This pattern downloads and executes a script directly in the shell without prior verification, posing a risk if the vendor's infrastructure or the transport is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands using the
bibiCLI for library management (listing, searching, and updating notes) andcurlfor interacting with the BibiGPT API athttps://api.bibigpt.co/. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and display untrusted data retrieved from external sources, which represents an injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through tools that list saved videos, search the library, or fetch specific notes (e.g.,
bibi library search,bibi notes getinworkflows/library-browse.mdandworkflows/notes-manage.md). - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched video summaries or notes.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute CLI commands and make network requests via
curland thebibibinary. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation of the retrieved API data before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://bibigpt.co/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata