ralph-review-deep
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple local shell commands to manage project state and orchestrate the review process.
- Uses
git,bd, andjqto validate project artifacts and the dependency graph integrity. - Employs
opencode runto launch three parallel sub-agent sessions for multi-model evaluation. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Local project content and documentation are sent to external LLM providers (OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic) as part of the multi-model review workflow.
- Ingests content from
.llmtmp/artifacts,README.md,CLAUDE.md, and project documentation in.llmdocs/. - Dynamically reads additional files specified in the plan's 'plan documents' section.
- This behavior is consistent with the skill's stated purpose of cross-model consensus but involves sharing project data with third-party AI services.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates an indirect prompt injection surface and uses behavior-override instructions.
- Ingestion points: Processes
.llmtmp/ralph-plan.md,README.md,CLAUDE.md,.llmdocs/*.md, and user-defined 'plan documents' (parsed in Step 4). - Boundary markers: Wrapped content uses
=== path ===headers, but there are no explicit instructions to the models to ignore embedded directives within that content. - Capability inventory: The sub-agents invoked via
opencode runare capable of performing tool calls (e.g., writing output files). - Sanitization: No escaping, validation, or sanitization of the ingested file content is performed before interpolation into the sub-reviewer prompts.
- Behavioral instructions: The sub-agent prompt includes forceful directives intended to override default model behavior (e.g., "Nobody reads your text responses", "Do not ask questions", "Your VERY NEXT action must be a tool call").
Audit Metadata