transcript-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a shell command that interpolates a user-provided query:
~/.config/dotfiles/submodules/total-recall/.venv/bin/python .../retrieve.py "QUERY". If the user input is not sanitized, this allows for command injection attacks where an adversary could execute arbitrary code by including shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,|,`) in their search query. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the file
~/.claude/session_memory.db, which contains a global history of all project sessions, past decisions, actions, and context. This constitutes a significant exposure of sensitive personal and professional data that could be exfiltrated if the agent is compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Historical transcript data is retrieved from the local
session_memory.dbdatabase and loaded into the agent context. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not provide delimiters or instructions to ignore commands embedded within the retrieved transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via the
retrieve.pytool and read local files. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the retrieved transcript data before it is re-processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata