self-improve
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from local session logs which contain previous user prompts. Malicious instructions embedded in those prompts could influence the agent during the retrospective analysis.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/transcript.pyparses project session history from files in standard directories like~/.claude/projects/or~/.cursor/projects/. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on simple digest markers (
[turn] USER: ...) and model judgment without robust boundary delimiters or explicit 'ignore' instructions for the parsed content. - Capability inventory: The agent can clone repositories, push code branches, create GitHub Issues/PRs, and overwrite local skill files ('sync' functionality).
- Sanitization: Prompts in the digest are clipped but not sanitized for instruction-like patterns.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill supports a self-update flow where it loads and executes a newer version of its own instructions (
SKILL.md) from a remote vendor-controlled repository (jinsyin/skills) if the local version is outdated. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Local Python scripts (
transcript.py) and external repository tools (e.g.,./skillsw install) are executed to perform session analysis and repository management tasks.
Audit Metadata