sprint-planner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied implementation plans or descriptions to generate structured agent sprints. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the input plan could influence the agent's behavior during the decomposition or subsequent execution phases.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the argument path or user-provided description in
SKILL.md(Workflow Step 1). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or warnings to separate user-provided plan content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The generated sprint definitions include instructions for shell command execution (e.g.,
dotnet build,gitoperations, and verification commands) and filesystem state changes, as seen inreferences/execution-protocol.mdandassets/sprint-template.yaml. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the external plan content before it is processed or interpolated into the output.
Audit Metadata