sparc-methodology

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and run the 'claude-flow' package from the NPM registry. This package is maintained by an external repository ('ruvnet/claude-flow') that is not identified as a trusted source for this environment.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of 'npx' commands (e.g., 'npx claude-flow sparc run') results in the execution of remote scripts within the local execution environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill describes workflows where user-supplied 'task descriptions' are passed as arguments to shell commands. This pattern creates a potential vector for command injection if the task strings contain malicious shell metacharacters.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface due to its data ingestion capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The 'researcher' mode fetches content from external websites via web search and fetch tools, while the 'reviewer' mode processes code and metadata from GitHub pull requests.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to isolate untrusted external content from the agent's core logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has powerful capabilities including autonomous code generation ('coder' mode), multi-agent task orchestration ('orchestrator' mode), and persistent memory storage ('memory-manager').
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation steps are described for data retrieved from external URLs or code reviews before it is integrated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 25, 2026, 07:11 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — sparc-methodology