harness
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration logic relies on shell scripts (
orchestrate.sh,spawn-agent.sh) to manage sub-agents and local state. These scripts execute commands likeopenclaw sessions spawnand perform filesystem operations within the~/.openclawdirectory to maintain the harness environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it interpolates untrusted user input (task descriptions) directly into the system prompts of sub-agents. Specifically, the
workeragent receives these instructions and possessesexecutepermissions, creating a risk that malicious data in a task description could influence the agent to perform unauthorized code execution. - Ingestion points: The
TASK_DESCvariable inscripts/orchestrate.shandscripts/spawn-agent.shcaptures external user input. - Boundary markers: The skill uses basic Markdown headers (
## 태스크) to separate user input, but lacks robust delimiters or escaping to prevent instruction hijacking. - Capability inventory: The
worker.mdagent is explicitly grantedwrite: trueandexecute: truepermissions. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the user-provided task description is performed before it is passed to the sub-agents.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references external services for model access (
api.z.ai,api.openai.com) and suggests installation viaclawhub. These references target well-known technology providers and infrastructure associated with the skill's stated purpose, and are handled according to standard API key management practices.
Audit Metadata