skills/jkf87/openclaw-harness/harness/Gen Agent Trust Hub

harness

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration logic relies on shell scripts (orchestrate.sh, spawn-agent.sh) to manage sub-agents and local state. These scripts execute commands like openclaw sessions spawn and perform filesystem operations within the ~/.openclaw directory to maintain the harness environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it interpolates untrusted user input (task descriptions) directly into the system prompts of sub-agents. Specifically, the worker agent receives these instructions and possesses execute permissions, creating a risk that malicious data in a task description could influence the agent to perform unauthorized code execution.
  • Ingestion points: The TASK_DESC variable in scripts/orchestrate.sh and scripts/spawn-agent.sh captures external user input.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses basic Markdown headers (## 태스크) to separate user input, but lacks robust delimiters or escaping to prevent instruction hijacking.
  • Capability inventory: The worker.md agent is explicitly granted write: true and execute: true permissions.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the user-provided task description is performed before it is passed to the sub-agents.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references external services for model access (api.z.ai, api.openai.com) and suggests installation via clawhub. These references target well-known technology providers and infrastructure associated with the skill's stated purpose, and are handled according to standard API key management practices.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 05:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — harness