spark-gen
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill attempts to download and install an external AI agent skill using
npx skills add https://github.com/latent-spaces/brag --skill brag -g. The source repository is not a known trusted organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to process video, manage files, and gather project metadata:
npx skills add ...andnpx hyperframes doctorfor environment setup.ffprobeandffmpegfor video validation and re-encoding.git shortlog -sn --no-mergesto extract contributor information.Compress-Archive(PowerShell) orzip(POSIX) to package the final deliverables.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill collects and exposes metadata about the repository's contributors by extracting real names from Git logs (
git shortlog -sn). It also instructs the user to manually send the resulting archive to the author's contact points. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill uses the
-g(global) flag when installing thebragskill, which modifies the global agent environment across sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data to generate project descriptions:
- Ingestion points: Reads the project's
READMEand source code (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; there are no instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands in the source files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution (
npx,ffmpeg,git,zip) which could be abused if malicious instructions are parsed from the project files. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested file content is performed before generating the YAML metadata.
Audit Metadata