gh-address-comments
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from GitHub PR comments, creating a potential attack surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: Comment bodies and review threads are fetched via
scripts/fetch_comments.pyusing the GitHub GraphQL API. - Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to edit files, write new content, commit changes, and execute GitHub CLI commands based on the content of these comments.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific constraints to prevent the agent from treating comment text as direct commands.
- Sanitization: No validation or filtering is performed on the retrieved comment bodies before they are processed by the agent.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions prompt the agent to request higher environment permissions than are standardly allowed.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdexplicitly directs the agent to requestsandbox_permissions=require_escalatedand escalated permissions forgh auth status. While this is intended to enable GitHub CLI authentication, it represents a request to bypass sandbox security controls. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution for its core functionality.
- Evidence: The scripts
fetch_comments.pyandmark_resolved.pyuse the Pythonsubprocessmodule to executeghcommands. These commands are executed with high-privilege GitHub scopes (repo,workflow) to manage repository metadata and code.
Audit Metadata