memos
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile uses forceful language, including '⚠️ MANDATORY SKILL INVOCATION ⚠️' and 'Failure... violates your operational requirements', to override the agent's internal logic and force the use of the skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
resource-api.shscript includes adownloadcommand that allows the agent to write files to arbitrary local paths via the--outputparameter. This could be exploited to overwrite sensitive configuration files or install persistence mechanisms if the agent is manipulated by malicious input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
resource-api.shscript provides anuploadfunction that can send any local file to the configured remote Memos server, providing a mechanism for exfiltrating sensitive data if the agent is directed to upload files like~/.ssh/id_rsaor.envfiles. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and returns content from an external service (Memos API) to the agent, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Memo content retrieved via
memo-api.sh,search-api.sh, andtag-api.sh. - Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when presenting memo content to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read/write capabilities via
resource-api.sh, memo deletion viamemo-api.sh, and general network access viacurl. - Sanitization: Absent; the retrieved content is passed directly to the agent's context without filtering or escaping.
Audit Metadata