paperless-ngx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Behavioral Override Instructions. The SKILL.md file employs high-pressure language (e.g., "MANDATORY SKILL INVOCATION", "YOU MUST invoke", "Failure... violates your operational requirements") designed to force the agent to use the skill regardless of context, which is a tactic used to bypass safety protocols.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Arbitrary File Write Vulnerability. The download command in scripts/paperless-api.sh allows an --output parameter without restriction. This could be abused to overwrite sensitive system files, configuration files (like shell profiles), or SSH authorized_keys if the agent is manipulated into specifying a malicious path.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Ingestion of Untrusted Data Surface. 1. Ingestion points: Document content and metadata are fetched via scripts/paperless-api.sh and scripts/tag-api.sh and passed to the agent. 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to help the agent distinguish between data and potential commands within documents. 3. Capability inventory: The skill provides access to shell execution (bash), network requests (curl), and file write capabilities. 4. Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the document content retrieved from the API before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 19, 2026, 02:57 AM