plex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile employs a 'MANDATORY SKILL INVOCATION' block with imperative language ('YOU MUST', 'NOT optional') and operational threats ('violates your operational requirements') to override the agent's decision-making process for tool selection. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In
scripts/plex-api.sh, thePLEX_TOKENis appended to URLs as a query parameter. This practice is insecure as it often results in the sensitive token being recorded in web server access logs, proxy logs, and the user's shell history. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect injection surface through the processing of user-supplied parameters.
- Ingestion points: Arguments for
section_id,rating_key, and searchquerypassed toscripts/plex-api.sh. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following directions embedded in the media data or query parameters.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
curlfor network requests andjqfor data parsing. - Sanitization: Partial. While search queries are URL-encoded,
section_idandrating_keyare directly interpolated into the request path, creating a potential path traversal vulnerability where an attacker could access unauthorized API endpoints on the Plex server.
Audit Metadata