jetpack-compose-expert
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands for its core automation features, specifically for project type detection and pull request analysis.
- Evidence (
references/auto-init.md): Usesfind,grep, and directory traversal (..) to search for Compose-related strings in Gradle build files and Kotlin source code during session initialization. - Evidence (
references/pr-review.md): Instructs the agent to usegh pr diff,gh pr view, andgh apito fetch data from GitHub. It also utilizescatandfindto inspect local project configuration files like.editorconfigand lint settings. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the retrieval of external data from GitHub repositories to perform code reviews.
- Evidence (
references/pr-review.md): Fetches code diffs and full file contents from the GitHub API using theghCLI. While these downloads target well-known services (GitHub), the content being retrieved is untrusted code from pull requests provided by the user. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its automated analysis of external, untrusted code.
- Ingestion points: Pull request diffs and file contents fetched from remote GitHub repositories (
references/pr-review.md). - Boundary markers: While the skill provides a structured workflow for reviews and emphasizes local reporting, it lacks explicit instructions for using delimiters to isolate untrusted content from the agent's internal instruction set.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands (
gh,find,grep,cat) which provides a mechanism for malicious instructions embedded in a PR to potentially influence the environment if not handled carefully. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or filtering of the external code before it is processed by the AI agent.
Audit Metadata