claude-md-improver
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill metadata claims the author is 'claude-plugins-official', which contradicts the provided author information 'JNZader-Vault'. This use of 'official' is deceptive and could mislead users regarding the skill's provenance.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an Indirect Prompt Injection surface because it reads and processes user-controlled data to influence its audit reports and file update proposals.
- Ingestion points: Uses the Read and Glob tools to fetch content from files named CLAUDE.md, .claude.md, and .claude.local.md, as well as global configuration at ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md.
- Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when reading these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash and Edit tools, which could be abused if malicious instructions in the audited files are followed.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or schema validation is performed on the ingested content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute shell commands for discovery purposes, specifically using 'find' to locate configuration files within the project directory.
Audit Metadata