mlflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The Docker Compose configuration includes hardcoded credentials in environment variables (
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: mlflow,MLFLOW_BACKEND_STORE_URI=postgresql://mlflow:mlflow@postgres:5432/mlflow). While these appear to be default values for a local development environment, hardcoding passwords in configuration files is a security risk. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The functions
load_modelandload_model_versionutilizemlflow.sklearn.load_model. This operation involves deserializing Python objects (typically usingpickle), which can lead to arbitrary code execution if the model artifact being loaded has been tampered with or originates from an untrusted source. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from an MLflow tracking server, such as experiment names, run tags, and model descriptions.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched via
MlflowClient().search_runsandclient.get_latest_versionsinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands within the fetched metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool for operations likemlflow models serve. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of escaping or validation of the data retrieved from the MLflow backend.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly uses the
Bashtool to run commands for serving models and building container images, providing a potential path for command injection if parameters are not handled carefully.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata