agent-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions specify the use of the
codextool with high-privilege flags (--sandbox danger-full-access) and explicitly disables user confirmation (--ask-for-approval never). This configuration enables the agent to implement code and execute shell commands without human oversight during the loop iterations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The multi-agent pipeline (Planner, Implementor, Reviewer, Judge) operates on external data from
prd.jsonandprogress.txtwhich directly influences agent behavior. - Ingestion points: The
PLANNERreadsprd.jsonto select implementation tasks, and theIMPLEMENTORuses the project context to generate code changes (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no documented delimiters or safety instructions to prevent malicious content within the PRD or codebase from hijacking the agent's actions.
- Capability inventory: The implementor utilizes
codexwith full sandbox access to write to the file system and commit changes, while the reviewer and judge execute generated tests and code. - Sanitization: The skill mentions structural schema validation for the PRD, but no content-level sanitization or instruction filtering is present.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for executing local CLI tools and deployment scripts located in the vendor's repository (
~/Code/joelhooks/joelclaw/), includingpublish-system-bus-worker.shand severaljoelclawsubcommands for loop management.
Audit Metadata