skills/joelhooks/joelclaw/agent-loop/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agent-loop

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions specify the use of the codex tool with high-privilege flags (--sandbox danger-full-access) and explicitly disables user confirmation (--ask-for-approval never). This configuration enables the agent to implement code and execute shell commands without human oversight during the loop iterations.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The multi-agent pipeline (Planner, Implementor, Reviewer, Judge) operates on external data from prd.json and progress.txt which directly influences agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The PLANNER reads prd.json to select implementation tasks, and the IMPLEMENTOR uses the project context to generate code changes (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no documented delimiters or safety instructions to prevent malicious content within the PRD or codebase from hijacking the agent's actions.
  • Capability inventory: The implementor utilizes codex with full sandbox access to write to the file system and commit changes, while the reviewer and judge execute generated tests and code.
  • Sanitization: The skill mentions structural schema validation for the PRD, but no content-level sanitization or instruction filtering is present.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for executing local CLI tools and deployment scripts located in the vendor's repository (~/Code/joelhooks/joelclaw/), including publish-system-bus-worker.sh and several joelclaw subcommands for loop management.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 23, 2026, 05:03 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agent-loop