agent-workloads
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation indicates that execution guidance may include the command
npx skills add -y -g <source>for installing external skills. The inclusion of the-yflag automatically accepts installation prompts, and since the source is not restricted, an agent following these instructions could download and execute malicious code from an untrusted remote repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a suite of vendor-specific CLI tools (
joelclaw) to perform core functions such as planning, dispatching, and running workloads. These tools interact with the local file system (e.g.,--write-plan ~/.joelclaw/workloads/) and potentially the network (e.g.,--send-mail). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon user-provided strings described as 'intent' and 'steering inputs'.
- Ingestion points: Found in
SKILL.mdandreferences/common-workloads.md, specifically the<intent>argument for the planning command and input forAcceptance:clauses. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are provided to prevent the agent from following malicious commands embedded within the user's intent.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including file writing, command execution via
joelclaw, and remote code installation vianpx. - Sanitization: The skill lacks any description of sanitization or validation for the user-provided steering inputs before they are used to generate execution plans.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata