egghead-slack

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from Slack messages, searches, and files through the conversations.history and search.messages API endpoints.
  • Ingestion points: Slack API responses processed in the message intelligence pipeline.
  • Boundary markers: Includes explicit rules ("JoelClaw NEVER participates in channels", "NEVER responds to other users") to prevent the agent from being manipulated into public actions by external messages.
  • Capability inventory: Performs network operations via curl to Slack and indexing services.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping of external message content is documented before processing.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a "Backfill Pipeline" that reads historical Slack data and indexes it into external services (Inngest and Typesense). While this is the intended purpose for the author, it involves the systematic movement of private organizational data (DMs, private channels, and files) to external infrastructure.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides template curl commands for interacting with the Slack API. These commands involve shell variable interpolation for secrets and query parameters which could be misused if query inputs are not properly sanitized.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill utilizes high-privilege Slack tokens (including admin and search:read.private scopes) and documents numerous internal IDs. However, it follows security best practices by managing the actual tokens through a secrets management system (secrets lease) rather than hardcoding credentials in the skill file.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 14, 2026, 12:06 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — egghead-slack