session-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides the agent with instructions to retrieve sensitive API keys using the command
KEY=$(secrets lease typesense_api_key). While not hardcoded, this enables the agent to programmatically access live credentials. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses SSH to execute commands on remote servers (e.g.,
ssh joel@flagg 'hostname && python3 --version ...'). This allows the agent to escape the local execution environment and execute arbitrary shell commands on remote infrastructure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell-based tools including the
joelclawvendor CLI,curl, andjqto query databases, manage session data, and inspect local files. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and processes raw agent session history logs stored at
~/.pi/agent/sessions/**/*.jsonl. These files contain detailed transcripts, commands run, and files touched, representing a significant data exposure risk if exfiltrated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Raw session transcripts in
.jsonlfiles (e.g.,~/.pi/agent/sessions/). - Boundary markers: Absent; instructions direct the agent to 'Read the JSON' and 'extract bounded task context' without delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution (
joelclaw), remote execution (ssh), network requests (curl), and credential retrieval (secrets). - Sanitization: The skill mentions redacting likely secrets but lacks sanitization or validation to prevent instructions embedded in past transcripts from influencing current agent behavior.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata