slack-link
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a custom command-line interface tool named
jc-slackto fetch message context and post replies. - Evidence: Found in
SKILL.mdwhich instructs the agent to runjc-slack context '<permalink>'andjc-slack reply '<permalink>' --text-file <path>. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it processes untrusted data from external Slack messages.
- Ingestion points: External Slack message content is ingested via the
jc-slack contextcommand inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions mention "returned bounded JSON" but do not provide explicit instructions to the agent to ignore or isolate potential commands within that data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has read capabilities (Slack context) and write capabilities (Slack replies) through the
jc-slacktool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from Slack before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata