session-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local directories containing user session histories and chat transcripts for multiple AI assistants and IDEs.
- Evidence: The skill defines access to paths including
~/.pi/agent/sessions/,~/.claude/projects/,~/.codex/sessions/,~/.cursor/acp-sessions/,~/.grok/sessions/, and~/.local/share/opencode/opencode.db. - Evidence: The skill checks for delivery status and logs in vendor-specific capture directories:
~/.joelclaw/capture/. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include a JavaScript-based execution pattern using
executor_executeto dynamically discover and invoke tools at runtime. - Evidence: The "Executor Code Mode" section provides a template that uses
tools.searchto find tool paths and then executes them viatools[recallTool.path]based on query results. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process raw transcript data and session history, which are untrusted sources that may contain malicious instructions from prior interactions.
- Ingestion points: Transcript files in
~/.pi/,~/.claude/,~/.codex/,~/.cursor/,~/.grok/, and~/.local/share/opencode/. - Boundary markers: The instructions advise citing session IDs and line windows, but do not specify robust delimiters or sanitization techniques to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the historical content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
executor_execute,session_search,session_context,session_inspect, andsession_chunksto process this data. - Sanitization: No explicit mention of sanitizing or escaping the retrieved transcript content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata