session-search

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local directories containing user session histories and chat transcripts for multiple AI assistants and IDEs.
  • Evidence: The skill defines access to paths including ~/.pi/agent/sessions/, ~/.claude/projects/, ~/.codex/sessions/, ~/.cursor/acp-sessions/, ~/.grok/sessions/, and ~/.local/share/opencode/opencode.db.
  • Evidence: The skill checks for delivery status and logs in vendor-specific capture directories: ~/.joelclaw/capture/.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include a JavaScript-based execution pattern using executor_execute to dynamically discover and invoke tools at runtime.
  • Evidence: The "Executor Code Mode" section provides a template that uses tools.search to find tool paths and then executes them via tools[recallTool.path] based on query results.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process raw transcript data and session history, which are untrusted sources that may contain malicious instructions from prior interactions.
  • Ingestion points: Transcript files in ~/.pi/, ~/.claude/, ~/.codex/, ~/.cursor/, ~/.grok/, and ~/.local/share/opencode/.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions advise citing session IDs and line windows, but do not specify robust delimiters or sanitization techniques to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the historical content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to executor_execute, session_search, session_context, session_inspect, and session_chunks to process this data.
  • Sanitization: No explicit mention of sanitizing or escaping the retrieved transcript content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 11:45 AM