hyperframes-registry
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a registry manifest and component files from the HyperFrames GitHub repository (github.com/heygen-com/hyperframes) using curl and the hyperframes CLI tool.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The hyperframes add command downloads HTML and JavaScript snippets from a remote registry and installs them into the local project for execution during rendering or previewing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions guide the agent to execute various subcommands of the hyperframes CLI and other Node.js-based tools via npx, including project publishing, rendering, and running local scripts like scripts/upload-docs-images.sh.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes external JSON data from the registry manifest, which contains descriptive fields that could be manipulated.
- Ingestion points: External JSON manifests (registry.json, registry-item.json) fetched from raw.githubusercontent.com (SKILL.md, references/discovery.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the manifest data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to perform file system writes (hyperframes add), execute local CLI tools, and perform network uploads (npx hyperframes publish).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation for the metadata retrieved from the remote registry.
- Mitigation: Implement strict schema validation for registry manifests and include clear boundary markers or warnings when the agent processes descriptive fields from the registry.
Audit Metadata