skill-publisher
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/publish_skill.pyis vulnerable to command injection. It extracts thenamefield from a skill'sSKILL.mdfrontmatter and interpolates it directly into a shell command string that is executed usingsubprocess.runwithshell=True. A malicious skill name containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,skill-name; rm -rf /) would result in arbitrary code execution in the user's shell context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script extensively uses
subprocess.runwithshell=Truefor various tasks involving user-controlled or file-extracted variables, includinggitoperations,ghCLI calls, andnpxcommands. This pattern is inherently unsafe for handling potentially untrusted data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script modifies the user's home directory by creating symbolic links in
~/.agents/skills/. This is intended to facilitate sharing skills across different AI agent platforms, but it represents a side effect on the host system configuration beyond the project directory.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata