work-implement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions reference an external repository
mattpocock/skillsfor the/tddfunctionality. This constitutes a dependency on third-party code from a source outside the verified vendor scope. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs several file system and version control operations as part of its workflow, including:
- Executing
git rev-parse HEADandgit logto track state. - Creating symbolic links (symlinking
CLAUDE.mdtoAGENTS.md). - Deleting ledger files (
progress.txtandplans/*.md) during the 'purge' phase. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface due to its reliance on untrusted external data:
- Ingestion points: The agent reads and trusts instructions from
progress.txt,CONSTITUTION.md, and user-provided plan files inplans/*.md(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill explicitly instructs the agent to "trust it [progress.txt] ... over your own memory."
- Capability inventory: The controller agent has the capability to spawn subagents (Implementers and Reviewers) and provide them with content extracted from these files. It also manages file writes to
AGENTS.mdandCONTEXT.md. - Sanitization: Absent. The instructions mandate passing findings and task sentences verbatim to subagents during the dispatch and fix loops.
Audit Metadata