work-prototype
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill directs the agent to read
CONTEXT.mdto inform the creation of prototypes, which introduces a potential vector for instructions hidden in data to influence the subagent's code generation. - Ingestion points: Reads
CONTEXT.mdfrom the local repository environment. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the subagent to treat the context data as untrusted or to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The subagent can write files and generate commands intended for local execution.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the context file content is performed before it is passed to the builder subagent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions explicitly tell the agent to invoke an external skill from the
mattpocock/skillsrepository. This creates a dependency on a third-party codebase that is not managed by a verified trusted vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow concludes by providing a command for the human to run to execute the prototype. Because this command is generated by a subagent that may be influenced by external context (like
CONTEXT.md), there is a surface for command injection if the subagent is successfully manipulated.
Audit Metadata