atlassian-admin
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of processing external administrative requests.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from user access requests, offboarding requests, and integration requirements defined in the 'User Provisioning', 'User Deprovisioning', and 'Integration Setup' workflows in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions defined to prevent the agent from following malicious commands embedded within these external requests.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses significant administrative capabilities through the
Jira MCPandConfluence MCPintegrations, including user creation, permission modification, and global system configuration. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, validation, or filtering of the external request content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata