align
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses several shell commands to manage a local server and process job files.
- Evidence: Uses
curlfor health checks,nohupfor server persistence,openfor user interaction, and variousprompt-alignCLI commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Clones the
prompt-alignrepository from GitHub if it is not found in the local development environment. - Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/johnlindquist/prompt-align ~/prompt-alignis defined in the Requirements section. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Executes TypeScript code from the cloned repository using the Bun runtime.
- Evidence: Commands such as
bun <dir>/src/server.tsexecute scripts that are downloaded and updated at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as the agent's core behavior for task implementation is driven by external JSON content modified during the 'Edit' phase.
- Ingestion points: Reads task instructions from
~/.prompt-align/jobs/<jobId>/result.jsonin Phase 3. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill is instructed to treat the JSON content as a binding contract and standing authorization.
- Capability inventory: Repository inspection, file modification, and command execution for verification.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or verification of the human-steered or edited content in the JSON results is described.
Audit Metadata