joinlayer-pipelines
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted metadata and data samples from external systems, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context through tools like
discover_connection_schemaandpreview_pipeline(detailed inreferences/product-capabilities.md). - Boundary markers: The skill contains instructions to restrict preview data to the current request and to use curated error hints rather than full logs.
- Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to perform operational tasks such as
start_pipeline,update_pipeline_draft, andstop_run. - Sanitization: Guidelines enforce strict adherence to tool schemas and stable idempotency keys, though content-level sanitization of external data is not explicitly detailed.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill connects to the
joinlayer.appinfrastructure. It prioritizes data safety by prohibiting the collection or transmission of credentials within the AI conversation. Authentication is handled via secure OAuth flows in the user's browser, preventing the agent from seeing sensitive tokens or secrets. - Evidence found in
SKILL.mdandreferences/connector-contracts.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and connects to the vendor's official MCP endpoint (
https://mcp.joinlayer.app/mcp). This is a legitimate external dependency required for the skill's primary operation and is within the expected scope of the service provider. - Evidence found in
agents/openai.yamlandSKILL.md.
Audit Metadata