goal-maker
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection through workspace data.
- Ingestion points: Agent instructions are derived from objectives and constraints defined in
docs/goals/<slug>/goal.mdandstate.yaml(seeSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The system lacks explicit delimiters to separate user-provided task content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent roles utilize tools such as
Read,Grep,Glob, andBash, with theWorkerrole having workspace write access (seereferences/claude-code.md). - Sanitization: The
check-goal-state.mjsvalidation script checks for YAML structure but does not sanitize natural language objectives or constraints. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of shell commands for verification and validation.
- Worker tasks in
state.yamlcontain averifyfield with shell commands intended for execution by the agent to confirm task completion. - A local utility,
scripts/check-goal-state.mjs, is provided to validate board integrity and is intended to be run by the user or agent. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references well-known external tools and source repositories.
- It suggests the use of
pnpmfor executing project-specific tests and verification commands. - It links to the original
tolibear/goal-makerGitHub repository for credit and pattern reference. These references to well-known services do not escalate the security risk.
Audit Metadata