autonomous-agent-harness
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to configure the agent with official MCP servers from a well-known service.
- Evidence: Fetches and installs
@anthropic/memory-mcp-server,@anthropic/scheduled-tasks-mcp-server, and@anthropic/computer-use-mcp-serverusingnpxfor configuration in~/.claude.json. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses programmatic commands and automated scheduling tools to create a persistent agent loop.
- Evidence: Employs
claude -pfor programmatic execution andmcp__scheduled-tasks__create_scheduled_taskto establish recurring tasks (crons) that execute arbitrary prompts on a schedule. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by design through its autonomous data processing workflows.
- Ingestion points: Ingests untrusted data from external sources including GitHub pull requests, Exa search results, and calendar invite details as part of its automated background tasks.
- Boundary markers: The example prompts provided for the autonomous reviewer and research agent lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted extensive capabilities including local file system writes to memory stores, command-line execution via
claude -p, and full browser/desktop control via thecomputer-useMCP server. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the external content before it is interpolated into the agent's context for decision-making.
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