autonomous-loops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The architectures described (e.g., Infinite Agentic Loop, Continuous Claude PR Loop, Ralphinho) are designed to ingest untrusted or externally-influenced data to drive autonomous agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context from specification files (e.g., specs/component-spec.md), shared task tracking files (SHARED_TASK_NOTES.md), and CI/CD logs via 'gh run view'.
- Boundary markers: The provided prompt examples and scripts lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The loops utilize powerful capabilities including full shell access via 'claude -p', the GitHub CLI ('gh') for PR and run management, and version control tools ('git', 'jj').
- Sanitization: The patterns do not demonstrate sanitization or validation of external content before it is interpolated into agent prompts.
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