claude-handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to invoke the
claudeCLI via the shell to spawn background processes using the command templateclaude --bg --name "<descriptive name>" "<handoff summary>". This involves executing shell commands with strings generated dynamically from conversation data.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it incorporates untrusted data from the conversation history and user-supplied arguments into a summary that serves as the system prompt for a new background agent. - Ingestion points: The entire conversation history and user-provided arguments are used as context for the summary (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary instructions are used to isolate untrusted data within the command template or the resulting agent prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables shell command execution through the platform's CLI to initiate background tasks (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: The instructions provide a manual redaction requirement for sensitive data (API keys, passwords), but do not implement technical sanitization for shell injection or prompt injection safety.
Audit Metadata