code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell-level
gitcommands (e.g.,git diff,git log,git rev-parse) using a user-supplied<fixed-point>variable. If the underlying platform does not sanitize these inputs, a malicious user could provide a reference containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|) to execute arbitrary system commands. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted data which is then passed to sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
git diffoutputs, commit messages, and external specification files found in directories likedocs/,specs/, or.scratch/. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters (like XML tags or triple backticks) or provide "ignore instructions" warnings when passing this external data into the sub-agent prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute
gitcommands and spawn new sub-agents using theAgenttool. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or validating the content of the diffs or specifications before they are interpolated into prompts.
Audit Metadata