cursor-subagent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/run-cursor-subagent.shexecutescursor-agentoragentbinaries found in the system PATH. While this is the intended purpose, it grants the skill the ability to spawn external processes with significant privileges. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
!commandstyle evaluation (via the Preamble section) to check the environment. Specifically, it executesgit -C "$WORKSPACE" rev-parseandgit -C "$WORKSPACE" status. If$WORKSPACEwere maliciously crafted (e.g., through a prompt injection that changes the environment variable), it could lead to unexpected command execution behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The wrapper script uses
grep -F "$model"and other shell utilities to validate input. Although the script usesset -euo pipefailand quotes variables, the core functionality is centered around executing a powerful CLI tool (cursor-agent) that has its own workspace permissions and auth state. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The wrapper explicitly disables sandbox mode for the sub-agent using the
--sandbox disabledflag when callingcursor-agent. This increases the risk if the sub-agent is compromised or receives malicious instructions, as it will run without the CLI's native isolation layers.
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