process-substitution-fifos

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a recipe for a 'Named Coprocess' in SKILL.md that executes arbitrary Python code from a pipe using the exec() function. This pattern is inherently dangerous as it allows for arbitrary code execution if the input pipe receives data from an untrusted or attacker-controlled source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill demonstrates patterns for sourcing the output of external commands directly into the current shell environment (e.g., source <(aws configure export-credentials --format env)). This can lead to unexpected environment modifications or the execution of malicious commands if the external tool's output is compromised.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Multiple examples in SKILL.md illustrate sending data, including system log contents, to external recipients using the mail command (e.g., tee >(grep -i "CRITICAL" | mail -s "Critical Alert" admin@example.com)).
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill includes examples that access sensitive system files and logs, such as /var/log/syslog and /etc/config, which typically require elevated privileges to read. An agent following these patterns might attempt to escalate its own privileges or perform unauthorized data access.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external sources, making it vulnerable to indirect prompt injection if those sources contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested via curl from external APIs, ssh from remote servers, and tail/cat from system log files.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are used when interpolating external data into shell commands or processing pipelines.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful tools including bash, ssh, python3 (with dynamic execution), aws-cli, and mail.
  • Sanitization: The provided patterns rely on standard utilities like grep and jq for filtering but do not implement robust sanitization or validation of the ingested content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 02:18 AM