implement-with-subagents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted ticket content and interpolates it into subagent prompts, creating a vulnerability surface for embedded secondary instructions.\n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context from local markdown files in
.scratch/or remote trackers (e.g., GitHub, Linear) as defined indocs/agents/issue-tracker.md(seereferences/ticket-lifecycle.md).\n - Boundary markers: Boundary markers are absent; the
references/worker-contract.mdtemplate uses a simple text header and{full ticket markdown}placeholder without robust delimiters (like XML tags) or explicit instructions to the subagent to ignore embedded commands.\n - Capability inventory: The orchestrator and its workers execute subprocesses via
git, run project tests, and perform file system writes during the integration phase as seen inreferences/host-adapters.md.\n - Sanitization: Sanitization is absent; the skill does not define any processes for escaping or validating ticket content before it is passed to the subagent's execution environment.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator performs extensive shell operations for repository management and testing.\n
- Evidence: Uses
git worktree,git log,git rev-parse, andgit statusto manage ticket isolation and verify completion states across the orchestrator and worker worktrees.\n - Evidence: Invokes project-specific tests and coordinates the execution of external skills (
/code-review,/implement,/tdd) on the host system.
Audit Metadata