sdd-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests project source code and tests to verify task completion.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads existing project files, test results, and artifacts in
sdd-specs/during the implementation and convergence phases (SKILL.md,references/tasks-template.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore" instructions for external content, relying instead on the host agent's native safety filters.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of executing shell commands for tests, linters, and static analysis, as well as writing to the project filesystem (
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external code content is defined in the workflow.
- [SAFE]: The skill operates entirely within the local environment, creating and managing artifacts under a dedicated
sdd-specs/directory. - [SAFE]: The instructions explicitly state that the host agent's safety rules and user permissions take precedence, and implementation tasks require separate user authorization before execution.
- [SAFE]: Workflow state management utilizes standard local tools like
git hash-objectto ensure integrity and detect external modifications to spec artifacts. - [SAFE]: No evidence of prompt injection, data exfiltration, or malicious obfuscation was found in the instructions or templates.
Audit Metadata