notion-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's installation instructions include the command
curl -fsSL https://ntn.dev | bash. This pattern downloads a script from a remote domain and pipes it directly into the shell for execution, which is a high-risk practice that can be exploited for supply chain attacks if the remote server or domain is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute various subcommands of the
ntnbinary, including those that interact with the network (ntn api), manage files (ntn files), and deploy code (ntn workers deploy). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from an external source, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
ntn pages get <page-id>command retrieves Markdown content from Notion pages and presents it to the agent (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or clear "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing page content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including arbitrary API calls via
ntn api, file uploads viantn files create, and code deployment viantn workers deploy(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from Notion before it is processed by the agent.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill relies on and instructs the user regarding the management of the
NOTION_API_TOKEN. While this is functional, it involves the handling of high-privilege secrets that grant access to the user's workspace.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://ntn.dev - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata