youtube-transcript-dossier
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fetch_transcript.pyusessubprocess.runto call theyt-dlputility for metadata extraction. The command is constructed using a fixed list of arguments and a URL built from an 11-character video ID that is validated via regular expression, preventing arbitrary command injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on
yt-dlpandyoutube-transcript-api. During operation, it connects to YouTube's public infrastructure to retrieve video data. These are established services and the integration follows standard practices for the intended functionality. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted transcript data from YouTube.
- Ingestion points: Transcript snippets are fetched via
scripts/fetch_transcript.pyand provided to the agent context for synthesis. - Boundary markers: While the skill uses structured templates, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore any malicious prompts embedded within the transcript text itself.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute
yt-dlp(via subprocess) and read local user-provided cookie files for authentication. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of the transcript content before it is processed by the AI.
Audit Metadata