docx-svg
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
officeclicommand-line utility to perform document modifications, such as embedding pictures and setting wrap properties in.docxfiles. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The provided script
scripts/svg.pyimplements SVG support by performing runtime monkey-patching of thepython-docxlibrary. It replaces internal factory methods to allow the library to recognize and process SVG MIME types and signatures. This modification is localized to the skill's execution context and supports its primary stated purpose. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes SVG files, which are XML-based, creating a potential surface for malicious data processing.
- Ingestion points: SVG files (e.g.,
chart.svg) are read into memory and parsed using thexml.etree.ElementTreemodule inscripts/svg.py. - Boundary markers: No explicit security delimiters or boundary markers are used when processing the file content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local system (
doc.save) and execute shell commands (officecli). - Sanitization: The script uses the standard
xml.etree.ElementTreeparser which, by default, is susceptible to XML external entity (XXE) attacks if processing untrusted input. While no malicious intent is present, using a hardened parser likedefusedxmlwould be a recommended security best practice for handling external graphics.
Audit Metadata