Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, untrusted PDF files through libraries like
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpytesseract(OCR). - Ingestion points: PDF text extraction is performed in
SKILL.md(quick start and basic operations) andscripts/extract_form_structure.pyusingpdfplumber. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not include specific delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed PDF text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write files to the local system (
PdfWriter,PIL.Image.save) and convert documents to images, but does not include network exfiltration or shell execution on the extracted data. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the extracted text content is present.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyutilizes monkeypatching to modify the behavior of thepypdflibrary at runtime. - Evidence: The script overrides
DictionaryObject.get_inheritedwithpatched_get_inheritedto handle specific formatting issues in PDFOptfields. This is a targeted correction for library-specific behavior during form filling and does not incorporate untrusted input into the execution logic.
Audit Metadata