xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/soffice.pycontains a embedded C source code string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that is written to a temporary file and compiled at runtime usinggcc. The resulting shared object is then dynamically loaded into the LibreOffice process using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept and redirect system calls related to Unix domain sockets. - [PERSISTENCE]: The script
scripts/recalc.pypersistently modifies the user's LibreOffice configuration by writing a StarBasic macro to the application's local macro storage directory (Module1.xba). This modification persists across application restarts and can affect the behavior of future LibreOffice sessions on the system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple external system commands via the
subprocessmodule, includinggccfor library compilation,sofficefor spreadsheet processing, andgitfor comparing document content. While the arguments are generally handled as lists to prevent shell injection, the reliance on these system tools expands the attack surface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted spreadsheet files which could contain malicious data designed to influence the behavior of the AI agent when the content is read into context.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
pd.read_excelandload_workbookas documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions to separate spreadsheet data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including file system access, command execution, and dynamic code execution.
- Sanitization: While the skill uses
defusedxmlto prevent XML-based attacks during parsing, it lacks explicit sanitization of cell content before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata