rclone
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation and setup script recommend a pattern that pipes a remote script directly into a shell for installation.
- Evidence:
scripts/check_setup.shandreferences/provider-operations.mdinclude the commandcurl https://rclone.org/install.sh | bash. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches an installation script from the official and well-known
rclone.orgdomain. - Evidence:
https://rclone.org/install.shreferenced inscripts/check_setup.sh. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and scripts that suggest the use of administrative privileges (
sudo) to install software. - Evidence:
scripts/check_setup.shechoes installation commands usingsudo bashandsudo apt install. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by retrieving and processing data (file names and remote metadata) from untrusted external sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill executes
rclone listremotes,rclone ls, andrclone lsdinscripts/check_setup.shand throughout theSKILL.mdworkflow. - Boundary markers: Absent; remote names and file paths are not enclosed in delimiters or accompanied by instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to remote storage (
rclone copy), delete files (rclone sync), and modify configurations (rclone config). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not explicitly validate or sanitize strings returned from remote storage listings before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata