skills/jscraik/agent-skills/rclone/Gen Agent Trust Hub

rclone

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation and setup script recommend a pattern that pipes a remote script directly into a shell for installation.
  • Evidence: scripts/check_setup.sh and references/provider-operations.md include the command curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | bash.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches an installation script from the official and well-known rclone.org domain.
  • Evidence: https://rclone.org/install.sh referenced in scripts/check_setup.sh.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and scripts that suggest the use of administrative privileges (sudo) to install software.
  • Evidence: scripts/check_setup.sh echoes installation commands using sudo bash and sudo apt install.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by retrieving and processing data (file names and remote metadata) from untrusted external sources.
  • Ingestion points: The skill executes rclone listremotes, rclone ls, and rclone lsd in scripts/check_setup.sh and throughout the SKILL.md workflow.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; remote names and file paths are not enclosed in delimiters or accompanied by instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to remote storage (rclone copy), delete files (rclone sync), and modify configurations (rclone config).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not explicitly validate or sanitize strings returned from remote storage listings before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 12, 2026, 01:14 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — rclone