video-transcript-downloader
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/vtd.jsusesnode:child_process.spawnto executeyt-dlpandffmpeg. It accepts arbitrary arguments through a--flag, which are passed directly to theyt-dlpbinary. This pattern allows for the injection of dangerous flags, such as--exec, which can be used to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system if the input source is untrusted. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's primary function is to fetch content from external URLs. It uses the
youtube-transcript-pluslibrary andyt-dlpto download media files, transcripts, and subtitles from various online platforms at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits vulnerability to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests and processes untrusted external transcript data.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through transcripts fetched by
youtube-transcript-plusandyt-dlpinscripts/vtd.js. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks clear delimiters or protective instructions (e.g., "ignore embedded instructions") when returning fetched transcript text to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The script
scripts/vtd.jspossesses the ability to execute shell commands viaspawnand perform file system operations like writing and copying files. - Sanitization: The script performs basic formatting cleanup (removing HTML tags and brackets), but it does not implement sanitization to prevent natural language instructions embedded within transcripts from influencing the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata