document
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources (git history and diffs) to generate prose.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via
git logandgit diffcommands executed inSKILL.md(Step 2). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the LLM to ignore embedded commands within the diffs or commit messages.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Write,Edit, andBashtools across its scripts, which could be exploited if an injection in a diff influences its output or subsequent actions. - Sanitization: While the
agent-prompt.mdfile contains instructions to avoid leaking secrets, it does not include filters or sanitization logic to mitigate prompt injection from the source material. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executegitandghcommands. These are utilized to retrieve repository history and manage pull requests. The usage targets the official GitHub CLI and standard git binary, which are well-known tools.
Audit Metadata